风险规避、社会网络对农地转出契约期限的影响

doi:10.12302/j.issn.1000-2006.202005053

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南京林业大学学报（自然科学版） ›› 2021, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (3): 217-223.doi: 10.12302/j.issn.1000-2006.202005053

风险规避、社会网络对农地转出契约期限的影响

周丽霞(), 蔡志坚^*(), 王杰, 秦希

南京林业大学经济管理学院,江苏南京 210037

收稿日期:2020-05-28 修回日期:2020-07-05 出版日期:2021-05-30 发布日期:2021-05-31
通讯作者: 蔡志坚
基金资助:
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2018 SJZDI099);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(17YJA790004)

Impacts of risk aversion and social networks on the contract period of land transfer

ZHOU Lixia(), CAI Zhijian^*(), WANG Jie, QIN Xi

College of Economics and Management,Nanjing Forestry University,Nanjing 210037,China

Received:2020-05-28 Revised:2020-07-05 Online:2021-05-30 Published:2021-05-31
Contact: CAI Zhijian

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

【目的】探究风险规避、社会网络对农地转出契约期限的影响,以此了解农户地转出契约期限决策以及促成更多的农地长期流转。【方法】提出研究假设并利用中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)2015数据进行实证检验,实证研究中利用Logit模型进行基准回归, 并采用Probit模型、OLS模型和异质性检验等方法进行稳健性检验。【结果】风险规避变量对农地长期转出契约期限的影响系数为负且在0.1的水平上显著;社交投资总额的估计系数为正但不显著;风险规避与社交投资总额交互项的估计系数为正且在0.1的水平上显著。风险规避对农户长期性农地流转契约选择具有负面作用;社会网络在长期性农地流转契约选择中的直接作用不显著;社会网络起调节作用,可缓解风险规避对农户长期性农地流转契约选择的负面影响。【结论】提高风险规避型农户选择长期性农地转出契约的意愿,需要降低农户在长期性农地流转中所面临的各类风险,并且要注重构建与维持农户的有效社会网络。

关键词: 风险规避, 社会网络, 农地流转, 长期契约

Abstract:

【Objective】This study explores the impacts of risk aversion and social networks on the contract period of farmland transfer, so as to promote the long-term transfer of farmland. 【Method】CHFS 2015 data of China Household Financial Survey were used for the empirical testing of the research hypothesis. A Logit model is used for a benchmark regression, and a probit model, OLS model and heterogeneity test are used for robustness tests. 【Result】The coefficients of influence of risk aversion variables on the long-term transfer contract of farmland are negative and significant at the level of 0.1. The estimated coefficients of the total social investment are positive but not significant. The estimated coefficients of the interaction item between the risk aversion and the total social investment are positive and significant at the level of 0.1. The risk aversion has a negative effect on farmers’ long-term land transfer contract selection. The direct role of social networks in the selection of such contracts is not significant. Social networks play a regulatory role, which can mitigate the negative impacts of risk avoidance on the aforementioned contract selection. 【Conclusion】The following measures should be used to increase the possibility of risk-averse farmers choosing long-term land transfer contracts: reduce the various risks faced by farmers in the long-term land transfer and focus on building and maintaining an effective social network for farmers.

Key words: risk aversion, social network, farmland transfer, long-term contract

中图分类号:

F301.0

周丽霞,蔡志坚,王杰,等. 风险规避、社会网络对农地转出契约期限的影响[J]. 南京林业大学学报（自然科学版）, 2021, 45(3): 217-223.

ZHOU Lixia, CAI Zhijian, WANG Jie, QIN Xi. Impacts of risk aversion and social networks on the contract period of land transfer[J].Journal of Nanjing Forestry University (Natural Science Edition), 2021, 45(3): 217-223.DOI: 10.12302/j.issn.1000-2006.202005053.

图/表 4

表1

表2

基准回归模型参数估计结果"

变量类型 type	变量 variable	Logit(1)	Logit(2)	Logit(3)
核心解释变量 independent variable	A	-0.098^*(0.055)	-0.095^*(0.055)	-0.099^*(0.054)
	lnS_p	—	0.024(0.020)	-0.030(0.037)
	A $·$ lnS_p	—	—	0.075^*(0.044)
控制变量 control variable	S	0.011^***(0.004)	0.011^***(0.004)	0.010^***(0.004)
	n	-0.005^**(0.002)	-0.004^*(0.002)	-0.004^*(0.002)
	E_du	-0.021(0.024)	-0.023(0.024)	-0.024(0.024)
	L_ab	-0.059^*(0.032)	-0.064^*(0.033)	-0.067^**(0.032)
	R_F	-0.221^***(0.081)	-0.222^***(0.082)	-0.227^***(0.081)
	R_FI	0.102(0.088)	0.105(0.089)	0.118(0.089)
	I_ns	-0.116^*(0.066)	-0.118^*(0.066)	-0.115^*(0.064)
	R_eg	控制	控制	控制
常数项constant		3.104^***(0.932)	2.123^***(1.238)	4.238^***(1.770)
伪R² pseudo R²		0.086	0.089	0.095
极大似然对数值log likelihood		-237.401	-236.625	-235.084
卡方值chi-square		32.85	36.18	41.07
观察值数number of observations		388	388	388

表2

表3

稳健性检验模型参数估计结果"

变量类型 type	变量 variable	Probit(1)	Probit(2)	Probit(3)	OLS(1)	OLS(2)	OLS(3)
核心解释变量 independent variable	A	-0.100^* (0.055)	-0.096^* (0.055)	-0.101^* (0.054)	-0.103^* (0.059)	-0.099^* (0.059)	-0.104^* (0.059)
	lnS_p	—	0.026 (0.020)	-0.030 (0.037)	—	0.024 (0.020)	-0.035 (0.040)
	A $·$ lnS_p	—	—	0.077^* (0.043)	—	—	0.078^* (0.046)
控制变量 control variable	S	0.010^*** (0.003)	0.010^*** (0.003)	0.010^*** (0.003)	0.009^*** (0.002)	0.009^*** (0.002)	0.009^*** (0.002)
	n	-0.005^** (0.002)	-0.004^* (0.002)	-0.005^** (0.002)	-0.005^** (0.002)	-0.004^* (0.002)	-0.005^** (0.002)
	E_du	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.023 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.024)
	L_ab	-0.061^* (0.032)	-0.065^** (0.032)	-0.068^** (0.032)	-0.059^* (0.032)	-0.063^* (0.033)	-0.066^** (0.032)
	R_F	-0.213^*** (0.078)	-0.215^*** (0.078)	-0.222^*** (0.078)	-0.204^*** (0.074)	-0.205^*** (0.074)	-0.211^*** (0.074)
	R_FI	0.091 (0.088)	0.095 (0.088)	0.109 (0.088)	0.086 (0.082)	0.088 (0.082)	0.102 (0.082)
	I_ns	-0.119^* (0.067)	-0.120^* (0.067)	-0.117^* (0.066)	-0.124^* (0.072)	-0.125^* (0.072)	-0.122^* (0.071)
	R_eg	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
常数项constant		1.908^*** (0.560)	1.258^*** (0.743)	2.586^*** (1.064)	1.168^*** (0.194)	-0.960^*** (0.262)	1.434^*** (0.388)
伪R² pseudo R²		0.086	0.089	0.096	—	—	—
R²		—	—	—	0.107	0.110	0.118
极大似然对数值log likelihood		-237.512	-236.588	-234.974	—	—	—
卡方值chi-square		36.22	40.15	45.21	—	—	—
观察值数number of obs		388	388	388	388	388	388

表3

表4

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变量类型 type	变量名称 variable	定义 description	均值 mean	标准差 SD
被解释变量 explaimed variable	契约期限(P_er)	1=1 a以上,0=1 a以内	0.608	0.419
核心解释变量 key explanatery variable	是否风险规避(A)	1=是,0=否	0.773	0.419
核心解释变量 key explanatery variable	年社交投资总额(取对数)(lnS_p)	家庭年度社交投资的总额	7.727	1.237
控制变量 control variable	转出农地面积(S)/hm²	转出经营权的耕地面积	6.410	9.461
	户主年龄(n)/a	户主的实际年龄	60.802	11.301
	户主文化程度(E_du)	1=没上过学,2=小学,3=初中,4=高中,5=中专/职高,6=大专/高职,7=大学本科,8=硕士研究生,9=博士研究生	2.637	1.301
	50岁以上劳动力(L_ab)	家庭50岁以上劳动力数量	0.585	0.765
	家庭务农人数占比(R_F)	农户中务农人数占总劳动力的比率	0.281	0.380
	农业收入占比(R_FI)	农户中农业收入占总收入的比率	0.143	0.312
	是否有养老或失业保险(I_ns)	1=是,0=否	0.869	0.338
	区域虚拟变量(R_eg)	东部(基准组):1=东部,0=其他中部:1=中部,0=其他西部:1=西部,0=其他	0.353 0.384 0.263	0.479 0.487 0.441

风险规避、社会网络对农地转出契约期限的影响

Impacts of risk aversion and social networks on the contract period of land transfer

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变量类型 type	Logit(1)
变量类型 type	高社会网络组 high social network	低社会网络组 low social network
核心解释变量 independent variable	-0.022 (0.081)	-0.179^** (0.075)
控制变量control variable	已控制	已控制
常数项constant	2.833^** (1.274)	3.691^*** (1.440)
伪R² pseudo R²	0.044	0.106
极大似然对数值log likelihood	-121.245	-113.929
卡方值chi-square	0.044	21.87
观察值数number of obs	194	194

[1]	杨梦, 彭红军. 看跌期权下的风险规避型营林企业最优策略[J]. 南京林业大学学报（自然科学版）, 2023, 47(4): 244-252.
[2]	石树敏,王楠,李扎西姐. 白马鸡繁殖期等级行为和社群结构的社会网络分析[J]. 南京林业大学学报（自然科学版）, 2019, 43(03): 137-144.