【目的】在“双碳”目标背景下,通过分析碳汇价格保险对碳汇林经营的影响,为碳汇林经营管理提供决策参考。【方法】以营林主体和保险公司构成的碳汇价格保险合同为研究对象,运用条件风险价值(CVaR)度量准则和 Stackelberg 博弈模型,研究碳汇价格保险下碳汇林的经营策略。【结果】当碳汇价格保险中碳汇目标价格较低时,营林主体风险规避程度的增加会降低碳汇林的种植规模、碳汇总量与保险费用,但也会提高单位面积碳汇量。当碳汇价格保险中碳汇目标价格较高时,碳汇林的种植规模、碳汇总量与保险费用不受营林企业风险规避程度的影响。碳汇价格保险中的碳汇目标价格的增加和碳汇价格保险补贴率的增加都能提高种植规模和碳汇总量,但会降低单位面积碳汇量。此外,在相同的政府补贴额度下,政府补贴保险公司比补贴营林企业更能促进种植规模与碳汇总量的增长,但两种补贴方式的边际效率都是递减的。【结论】营林企业可通过购买林业碳汇价格保险来减少自身风险规避行为对碳汇林经营的影响。营林企业和保险公司在协定碳汇价格保险中的碳汇目标价格时,需将碳汇目标价格设定在合理范围内。政府可将补贴营林企业和补贴保险公司两种补贴方式相结合,从而提高碳汇质量和供给。

【Objective】 Under the background of a “dual carbon” objective, the optimal management strategy of carbon sink forest under carbon sink price insurance was studied with the aim of providing a reference for decision-making of carbon sink forest management.【Method】 Taking the carbon sink price insurance contract composed of forest operators and insurance companies as the research object, the conditional value at risk (CVaR) measurement criterion and Stackelberg game model were used to study the management strategy of carbon sink under carbon sink price insurance.【Result】When the target price of carbon sink in carbon sink price insurance was low, the increase of risk avoidance degree of forest operators would reduce the planting scale of carbon sink forests, the total carbon sink, and insurance cost, but would increase the carbon sink per unit area. In contrast, when the target price of carbon sink in carbon sink price insurance was high, the planting scale of carbon sink forests, the total amount of carbon sink, and the insurance cost were not affected by the risk avoidance degree of forest enterprises. The results also showed that increases in the target price of carbon sink and the subsidy rate of carbon sink price insurance could increase the planting scale and the total carbon sink but reduced the carbon sink per unit area. In addition, if the government provided the same amount of premium subsidies to forest enterprises and insurance companies respectively, government subsidies for insurance companies could promote the growth of planting scale and total carbon sink more than subsidies for forest enterprises, but the marginal efficiency of both subsidy methods was decreasing. 【Conclusion】Forest enterprises can reduce the impact of their risk avoidance behavior on carbon sequestration forest management by purchasing carbon sequestration price insurance. When forest enterprises and insurance companies agree on the target price of carbon sink in carbon sink price insurance, they should set the target price of carbon sink within a reasonable range. The government can combine subsidies to forest enterprises and insurance companies to improve the quality and supply of carbon sinks.