Research on the operation mechanism of forest chief system based on a tripartite evolutionary game

LI Yuan, WANG Chao, LIANG Yueying, XU Bin, NING Youliang

JOURNAL OF NANJING FORESTRY UNIVERSITY ›› 2025, Vol. 49 ›› Issue (4) : 253-262.

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JOURNAL OF NANJING FORESTRY UNIVERSITY ›› 2025, Vol. 49 ›› Issue (4) : 253-262. DOI: 10.12302/j.issn.1000-2006.202406008

Research on the operation mechanism of forest chief system based on a tripartite evolutionary game

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Abstract

【Objective】The implementation of the forest chief system faces the dual challenges of vertical linkage and horizontal collaboration. Among them, horizontal collaboration is particularly difficult because it involves multiple interests and there is no strict hierarchical relationship between subjects, which has become a key bottleneck hindering the efficient operation of the forest chief system. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to clarify the interaction between the various horizontal stakeholders and promote the establishment of a horizontal cooperation mechanism.【Method】In this study, the horizontal stakeholders of the forest chief system were divided into management stakeholders, supervision stakeholders and passive stakeholders. Based on the stakeholder theory, a theoretical analysis framework was constructed, and a three-party asymmetric dynamic evolutionary game model was established. The evolutionary stability and evolutionary path of each party’s strategy selection were simulated and analyzed.【Results】(1)The importance of ecological location, the richness of forest resources, the development level of forestry industry, and the attention of superior departments and local governments were the external factors affecting the choice of horizontal cooperation behavior of the three parties, which affected the expected benefits and costs of the choice of horizontal cooperation behavior of the three parties. (2)The expected return and the cost were not only the internal factors that affect the choice of the three parties ‘horizontal cooperation behavior, but also the key variables that determine the choice of the three parties’ behavior. (3)It’s a difficult problem to mobilize their participation enthusiasm in the horizontal cooperation of the forest chief system, because some passive stakeholders were outside the forest chief system.【Conclusion】To strengthen the horizontal cooperation of the forest chief system, it’s key to accelerate the construction of a long-term mechanism which could follow the principles of restraint and incentive compatibility of all parties, and they form collective action through improving the assessment system and reward and punishment system. The purpose of the horizontal cooperation is to promote the transformation of the forest chief system from “nominal” to “real” as soon as possible, from comprehensive establishment to comprehensive effectiveness, and to achieve the unity of name and reality.

Key words

stakeholders / forest chief system / tripartite evolutionary game model / horizontal collaboration mechanism / collective action

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LI Yuan , WANG Chao , LIANG Yueying , et al . Research on the operation mechanism of forest chief system based on a tripartite evolutionary game[J]. JOURNAL OF NANJING FORESTRY UNIVERSITY. 2025, 49(4): 253-262 https://doi.org/10.12302/j.issn.1000-2006.202406008

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